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Abstract  
Many governmental organizations nowadays are 
setting up e-government initiatives to improve the delivery 
of services to citizens. Often, these initiatives require 
information exchange in networks of various 
governmental organizations in so-called back-offices. In 
this article, resource dependence theory and information 
property rights theory are used to analyze the complex 
mixture of cooperation and conflict that arises in these 
networks. The authors conclude that the use of novel 
process management techniques is a promising and 
fruitful alternative to the use of more ‘traditional’ project 
management techniques in the development of 
interorganizational, back-office information systems.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the literature on e-government, often the focus is on 
the organization of the front-office, and on the interaction 
between governmental agencies and citizens. However, in 
order for e-government initiatives to be successful, back-
office operations, and, more specifically, back office 
streamlining, have to be taken care of, too [1]. In a sense, 
back-office operations are the backbone of any form of e-
government, and they may require information exchange 
and knowledge sharing between various units, 
departments or organizations. In other words, back-office 
operations can be regarded as a Government-To-
Government (G2G) interaction.  
Wimmer, Traunmüller and Lenk describe a scenario in 
which “organizational boundaries will fade and give way 
to innovative organizational design. In this way, 
cooperation between administrative agencies will span 
wide: over distances, across organizational boundaries and 
even across hierarchical echelons” [2, p. 1, see also [1, 
5]].  
Actual e-government applications, however, show that 
the practice of e-government may not be as attractive as 
some of its benevolent proponents might claim. Back 
offices can be regarded as networks of organizations in 
which goals do not necessarily overlap and interests may 
collide. In practice, in these networks, information itself is 
the primary medium of value and exchange [3] and 
relatively uncontrolled sharing of such a powerful 
resource threatens information monopolies, provides those 
organizations who receive information with significant 
power gains [4, 5, 6] and may even threaten the reason of 
existence of some of the organizations involved in the 
process of information sharing. Consequently, existing 
dependencies in organizational networks might be 
affected and it can be expected that the exchange of 
information in back-offices invokes a complex mixture of 
cooperation and conflict [5, 6, 7, 8].   
In this paper, we address the following research 
question: what does the nature and dynamics of 
interorganizational relations mean for the development 
and implementation of e-government information systems, 
and what methods and strategies are used to design and 
implement these systems? The focus in the analysis is on 
the interorganizational relations that are mobilized 
through the integration of various back office systems [9]. 
In the remainder of this article, we analyze existing e-
government initiatives, and, more specifically, information 
relations between various back-offices, using a political 
economy view on information exchange [6]. 
Subsequently, we explore methods and strategies of ICT 
management in policy networks, and compare a view on 
ICT management as managing projects with a view 
indicating that ICT management also has to do with 
managing a process,  which is directed at achieving a 
shared meaning or understanding about the role and 
contribution of ICT applications between several back-
offices [10]. The paper will be concluded with lessons 
learned and recommendations for management approaches 
to be used for organizing G2G information exchange in e-
government initiatives. 
This article is structured as follows. In section two, 
some preliminary remarks are made about the topology of 
the Dutch system of governance, which may help to 
clarify the empirical setting and the analysis. The 
confusing mixture between conflict and cooperation in 
back-office interchange of information is analyzed in 
section three (‘The Political Economy of Information 
Exchange’). The confrontation of the political economy of 
information exchange and empirical data from Dutch 
back-office integration efforts is documented in section 
four. Section five provides recommendations and lessons 
learned, and the article ends with conclusions in section 
six.  
2. The Dutch Setting: Networks of 
Governmental Organizations and 
Authentic Registrations 
In the Netherlands, the relative popularity of the New 
Public Management (NPM) philosophy [11] has resulted 
in, among other things, the breaking-down of large 
organizations (for example in the fields of housing, social 
security, employment) in networks of relatively 
autonomous organizations (both concerned with policy 
development, as well as with policy execution, 
administrative surveillance, and so forth). Consequently, 
policy networks emerged in which separate, relatively 
autonomous organizations execute adjacent or even 
slightly overlapping administrative tasks.  This view of 
government as a network is increasingly appreciated as a 
means of steering complex societies in terms of co-
production and co-operative management [18].  
In terms of the use of information in these networks, 
there is a danger that several relatively autonomous 
organizations gather the same type of information of 
citizens or corporations. In relation to e-government, one 
can hypothesize that transactions can be handled more 
efficiently if the several back-offices involved use the 
same data or data definitions, and thus that standardization 
of data is a necessary condition for successful e-
government initiatives. In order to put these ideas to work, 
the principle of authentic registrations has been 
developed. This principle states that data is gathered once 
at the source, and then used many times by organizations 
in the network. The terms of use are formalized in 
multilateral agreements. The ownership of authentic 
registrations is attributed to specific organizations who are 
responsible for (and ideally have an interest in) ensuring 
the quality of data. These specific organizations can be 
regarded as ‘information owners’. Other organizations that 
need, for example, income data, do not gather these data 
themselves, but rather use the authentic registration. 
Inversely, the authentic registration can grant other 
organizations (designated) property rights by means of 
interchange agreements, but they are by definition 
‘residual claimants’, implying that the right to allocate 
rights not explicitly covered by an interchange agreement, 
resides with the information owner.  
A typical example of an authentic registration is the 
municipal register of citizens’ residential data, but it is 
also possible to think of the license and vehicle 
registration, the authentic registration of pollution and 
emissions and the fiscal income registration.  
In practice, if a citizen applies for an allowance or 
permit, her antecedents have to be checked and 
information exchange between various organizations (in 
the case of, for example, a welfare benefit: the municipal 
register for the appellant’s address, the job agency for her 
enrollment, the executive institution executing 
unemployment schemes for her job history, et cetera) 
takes place. 
3. The Political Economy of Information 
Exchange 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, it has been illustrated that 
many policy processes are fragmented over several 
administrative organizations. The relations between these 
organizations are to a certain extend governed by the 
principle of authentic registrations. This results in 
information exchange and organizational redesign in the 
back office.  
From a strictly instrumental point of view, the 
information relations between various organizations can 
be modeled in terms of secure XML document containers 
[12] or in terms of conversation rules, conversation 
classes and continuation rules using speech act theory 
[13].  
At an institutional level, however, other sets of 
questions arise. These questions are related to the 
complex mixture of cooperation and conflict that emerges 
when organizations start exchanging information across 
traditional organizational borders [5, 6, 7]. In order to 
illustrate some of these questions, we firstly present some 
anecdotal evidence of difficulties that arise when 
organizations exchange information across organizational 
boundaries. As the difficulties we would like to emphasize 
are not typical for the public sector [5, 6, 7], the anecdotal 
evidence stems from governmental organizations as well 
as from private sector organizations.  
A private sector illustration is the TransLease 
information system, an electronic commerce system 
owned by Cap Gemini and used by a thousand British 
repair agents working for seven vehicle leasing and 
contract hire companies [17]. TransLease uses 
standardized data formats throughout the network (which 
also enshrine the ‘rules of trade’) as the backbone of the 
system, in order to simplify the processing of auditing 
invoices. In practice, actual use of the system proved to be 
far below expectations. An evaluation showed that the 
TransLease system did not provide the envisaged mutual 
benefits to its participants:  “[a] dominant theme for repair 
agent complaints was their perception of an ‘unfair’ 
balance of power, which meant they felt that lease 
companies would tie them into a system that would 
reinforce and amplify existing power structures” [17, p. 
10).  
A public sector illustration is the Criminal Justice 
System in the United Kingdom [18]. The UK has heavily 
decentralized and compartmentalized criminal justice 
agencies, including for instance the police, the probation 
service and the magistrates courts. Early work on 
automated support centered on an elaborate dataflow 
model that showed the benefits of a new information 
system. It was soon clear, though, that the costs and 
benefits were unevenly divided among the parties 
involved, and that the specific cultures and professional 
norms of the various agencies were not reflected in 
operational methods and information management 
priorities. Therefore, a more piecemeal, incremental  
approach was chosen, in which various professional 
groups (lawyers, police officers, probation officers and 
prison officers) were allowed idiosyncratic discourses 
embedded in distinctive data definitions and - standards, 
yet these distinctive domains were very selectively 
connected using EDI interfaces and e-mail links1.  
Beynon-Davies, furthermore, describes an attempt to 
develop a generalized model of healthcare data to be used 
for information exchange in the British National Health 
Service (NHS) [20]. Despite large efforts the data model 
was severely resisted and has never actually been 
implemented. Although the development of the data 
model was originally portrayed as a neutral and 
technocratic exercise, the participating organizations very 
actively opposed the data model because it raised 
                                                           
1 A similar case description exists for the Dutch value 
chain of penal law enforcement [19].  
unforeseen, partly unintended and very fundamental 
questions about accountability within the network of 
cooperating organizations. Markus refers to this kind of 
situations as attempts to ‘ferret out how the knaves are 
doing in the trenches’ [4]. 
 
TransLease-, CJS- and the NHS-case are to a certain 
degree modest examples of situations in which exchange 
of information using information systems that cross 
organizational boundaries resulted in politicking, hoarding 
of information, sabotaging interorganizational information 
systems, et cetera [4, 6, 8]. These phenomena have also 
been observed in specific e-government initiatives where 
information exchange resulted in implicit or explicit data 
wars [ 21].   
3.2 Information Politics and Economic Use of 
Information  
From the anecdotal evidence provided so far, it is not  
clear why politicking, hoarding of information, and 
sometimes even manifest sabotage occur. In order to 
clarify the (intuitive) difficulties mentioned above, we turn 
to two streams in organization theory that focus on 
networks and interorganizational relations: political 
organization theory (more specifically: a political view on 
information exchange using resource dependence theory) 
and economic organization theory (more specifically, an 
economic view on information exchange using property 
rights theory). 
3.2.1 A Political View on Information Exchange 
Core to the TransLease and CJS illustrations is the 
notion of a delicate balance between ‘resource 
dependence’ of organizations in networks [16], and the 
nourishment of organizations’ informational autonomy 
[6]. According to resource dependence theory [16], 
organizations in networks may be willing to set up and use 
information systems that cross organizational boundaries 
in order to gain access to information controlled by other 
organizations, but yet may be unwilling to comply with 
arrangements that may not be designed to suit them (i.e., 
information handling procedures, terms of use and data 
models). In fact in information partnerships, according to 
resource dependence theory, every organizations strives to 
optimize its self-interest by (1) minimizing their 
dependence on other organizations and (2) maximizing 
the dependence of other organizations on themselves. 
Consequently, especially standardization (for example, of 
data definitions) is a very sensitive subject as it touches 
upon culturally or professionally accepted procedures 
which may not be given up easily. Bellamy illustrates this 
by stating that attempts to exchange information across 
organizational boundaries “not only reflect the structure of 
information domains, but in so doing reflect, legitimate 
and re-produce the discourses of powerful groups, 
validate their ways of steering and thinking, and give 
tangible force for to their influence on organizational life” 
[18, p. 299].  
Summarizing, according to resource dependence 
theory, information exchange, and especially 
standardization, may result in shifts in power balances 
between organizations. These shifts may even ultimately 
result in organizations losing their reasons to exist. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that organizations are very 
cautious in (unconditionally) exchanging information 
across organizational boundaries. It is unlikely that 
exchange of information in back-offices is an exception to 
this general observation.  
3.2.2 An Economic View on Information Exchange 
Although political organization theory provides an 
explanation for the organization-political struggle 
surrounding the development and use of information 
systems that cross organizational boundaries, decision 
makers or actors in general are usually less realistically 
depicted as aberrant managers or deviant technologists, 
focusing on political aspects, unconditionally nurturing 
organizational autonomy and ignoring effectiveness and 
efficiency. The politicking in relation to 
interorganizational information systems, however, is 
capable of being understood in other ways, among other 
things in ways that also include aspects of efficiency. In 
order to show how a more sophisticated understanding 
could throw more light on the topics under investigation 
here, we discuss a body of knowledge complementary to 
resource dependence theory, (information) property rights 
theory.  
 
Property rights theory provides an analysis of behavior 
of individuals with respect to assets (including 
information assets, [14, 15]), or behavior of organizations 
in G2G networks with respect to information assets. 
Crucial is the assumption of bounded rationality. In this 
context, bounded rationality refers to the impossibility to 
formalize all kinds of behavior in contracts that 
encompass all future contingencies. If we regard 
information systems as information assets, it is possible to 
analyze behavior with respect to these kind of information 
systems with property rights theory.  
In property rights theory, the notion of ‘ownership’ is 
emphasized. Full ownership of information systems, for 
example, involves the right to use an information system, 
to modify it with quality-enhancing or cost-saving 
features, and to appropriate the benefits of these 
adaptations. Using a neoclassical line of reasoning, it can 
be shown that an asset owner has intensive incentives to 
perform well.  
 
Because of bounded rationality, there will always be 
‘incompleteness’ of contracts, implying that there will 
always be residual property rights not covered in a 
contract. The institution that allocates these residual rights 
of is ownership [14] and hence, the owner is ‘residual 
claimant’. This situation occurs when in a network of 
organizations, one organization fully owns a central 
database while other organizations use it (that is, look in 
the database and/or enter information into the database) 
and contribute in the costs of the system through a agreed-
upon lease contract. Such a separation of ownership and 
actual use has important consequences for the behavior 
with respect to information assets, which can be 
characterized by the phrase ‘rental cars are driven less 
carefully than cars driven by their owners’ [14]2.  
For the specific situation described previously, it is 
relevant that the grand designs of information systems that 
cross organizational boundaries confronts participating 
organizations’ with an attenuation of property rights, and 
hence, their incentives to perform well are partly 
mitigated. This mitigation of incentives results in subtle 
intangible costs of low effort which will eventually appear 
as distorted, missing, or unusable data. The line of 
reasoning can be summarized as follows: the more the 
sense of ‘ownership’ is diminished, the less intense 
incentives will be. Consequently, the level of investments 
in the interorganizational information system will  
typically be lower, which in its turn affects the 
functionality, profitability, and eventually the viability of 
information sharing.  
3.2.3 Methods and Strategies for ICT Management  
It is interesting to note how, in practice, ICT 
management techniques cope with the difficulties 
                                                           
2 In property rights theory, there are two circumstances 
in which incentives by participants are best served by 
common control: strict complementarity of assets and/or 
strict indispensability of participants.  
presented by interorganizational character of many e-
government initiatives.  
A typical ICT management approach towards 
designing and building information systems to support 
information exchange in the context of e-government is a 
project management approach. Typical for project 
management is that: 
- a temporary endeavor is undertaken in order to 
create (1) a system architecture (including a 
standardized data format), (2) terms of use (3) and 
information handling procedures. These three 
components form the backbone of the information 
exchange;  
- goals are stated in a fixed and formalized way;  
- implementation is carried out in a step-by-step 
manner.  
 
The attributes of project management techniques 
characterize the main feature of project management 
itself: by means of formalizing goals, by decomposing 
tasks into smaller tasks and by identifying standardized 
products to be delivered at specific moments in time, risks 
are reduced.   
From the point of view of ‘regular’ policy development 
and/or ICT systems development, a choice for such an 
approach is readily understandable. The question is 
whether project management techniques can deal with the 
wide variety of interests the interorganizational character 
of e-government initiatives presents. For instance, the 
question arises how project management’s attempts to 
formalize goals and to identify subtasks relate to the 
intrinsic political nature of interorganizational relations as 
exemplified by resource dependence theory and property 
rights theory. And, referring to the before mentioned 
TransLease-, NHS- and CJS-anecdotal evidence, the 
question arises whether project management’s 
standardization and formalization attempts intensify or 
reduce organization-political struggle among 
organizations that already have suboptimal incentives to 
exchange information (see also [6]).  
3.3 Summary: the Political Economy of 
Information Exchange 
After reviewing both resource dependence theory and 
information property rights theory, some light is shed on 
the specific phenomena in the TransLease, NHS and CJS 
cases, and probably on issues of project management in 
developing interorganizational information systems in 
general. Standardization of data definitions and data 
standards that is pursued in order to exchange information 
across organizational boundaries may be geared to the 
requirements of some organizations participating in an 
organizational network, but not necessarily to the 
requirements of all organizations. In terms of resource 
dependence theory, standardization may intensify existing 
dependencies and enshrine these dependencies in the 
technology. In terms of information property rights theory 
standardization of data definitions and data standards can 
be conceived as a mitigation of property rights with 
respect to the information system. Consequently, 
participants are less inclined to invest in the system and to 
enhance the information system with cost-saving or 
quality-enhancing features, and eventually such a 
diminishment of incentives results in less profitable, less 
functional and even less viable interorganizational 
information systems. A typical symptom of lack of 
incentives is poor data quality, resulting from 
underinvestment in human and technical capital.  
So, despite intuitive appeal, it may be useful to 
investigate the value of project management techniques.  
4. Analysis: Case Studies of 
Interorganizational Information Systems 
In this section, two case studies of the development of 
interorganizational, back-office information systems are 
presented here: the development of the Dutch Municipal 
Register of Citizens’ Residential Data and development of 
the Dutch Vehicle Registration.  
The analyses presented here are based on secondary 
analyses of evaluation reports of the two systems, and on 
interviews and observations by one of the authors of this 
paper.  
The analysis of the cases is structured as follows: first, 
the policy network is described in term of history and 
relevant actors. Second, the development process is 
described in terms of goals, interests, and strategies 
employed by the various actors.  
4.1 Case 1: Dutch Municipal Register of 
Citizens’ Residential Data (GBA) 
The Dutch Municipal Register of Citizens’ Residential 
Data (GBA: Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie) is an 
authentic registration in which name, address, date of 
birth, sex, nationality, et cetera of residents in the 
Netherlands are recorded.  
Since the 1970s, there has been a lot of discussion on 
the question how an authentic registration of residential 
data should look like. Initially the discussions evolved 
around the idea of a centralized register. However, a 
centralized architecture of such an information system 
raised fundamental issues concerning the protection of 
privacy and moreover, concerning the institutionalized 
relationships between various levels of government (i.c., 
the central level and the local, municipal level). In 1984, a 
decentralized initiative was launched: the GBA. The 
discussion on the GBA involved the municipalities, 
which, at that time, ‘owned’ paper-based registers, the 
Netherlands Association of Municipalities (the 
municipalities’ interest association), the Ministry of the 
Interior and a Project Bureau (established in 1989). The 
Project Bureau’s original task was to develop, among 
other things, standardized applications on behalf of the 
Ministry.  
Gradually, the idea of a decentralized register took 
shape. The register was to be used and partly administered 
by more than 500 municipalities, while the data was to be 
are used by more than 300 public and private 
organizations.  
 
In the decision-making processes with respect to the 
development of the GBA, it became clear that various 
conflicts of interests existed with respect to the envisaged 
control over (or: ownership of) the system. These conflicts 
existed with respect to the following domains: 
- the control over and ownership of the GBA 
computer systems; 
- the control over and ownership of the network 
connecting the separate systems; 
- the control over and ownership of the data 
embodied in the system; 
- the legal framework  in which the above 
ownership and control issues were formalized; 
- the division of costs and benefits over the parties 
involved.  
 
In fact, it is possible to discern various arenas in the 
decision making with respect to the GBA. An example of 
such an arena is the decision making with respect to the 
ownership and control over applications (system level). 
Originally, it was the task of the Project Bureau to 
develop applications. The municipalities, however, 
thought that this would jeopardize their autonomy and 
they at least wanted to be able to select a system supplier 
by themselves.  
At this moment, it is possible to conclude that there a 
elements of a political economy present in the decision 
making with respect to the GBA: over time, there were 
disputes with respect to the question whether there should 
be a centralized system or a decentralized system, and 
when the decision was taken to implement a decentralized 
system, there were more or less constant quarrels over 
control and ownership issues with respect to several 
aspects of the system. As a result, the composition of 
project teams changed as individual members left these 
groups and others joined them.  
Eventually, in the process of waxing and waning, a 
solution was found by granting municipalities control and 
ownership over the data (municipalities were responsible 
for the acquisition, maintenance and dispersion of data), 
whereas central government was responsible for the 
system level (i.c. development of a data model, on basis of 
which eventually 15 system suppliers developed 
applications). Furthermore, the development of the legal 
framework took place in parallel with the development of 
the system itself.  
4.2 Case 2: Dutch Vehicle Registration (NKR) 
The second case concerns the development of the 
Vehicle Registration (NKR: Nieuwe Kenteken 
Registratie). The registration was initiated in 1981 and 
eventually put to use in 1995. The goal of the registration 
was to identify owners of licensed vehicles and vessels. 
Uses are to be found in the fields of taxation, liability, 
criminal prosecution, traffic safety projects, and 
environmental policy. Because of this wide variety of 
uses, many parties were involved in the development of 
the register: the ministries of the Interior, Economic 
Affairs, Finance, Justice and Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management. Furthermore, also the Dutch Center 
for Vehicle Technology and Information and the Central 
Traffic Police Commission were involved. And, apart 
from these institutions, representatives from the 
automotive industry (i.e., auto repair agents) and post 
office branches were consulted.  
The development of the register itself was carried out 
by a Project Organization, and involved not only the 
development of the system in a technical sense; it also 
required several changes in legislation. The intended 
system owner was the Center for Vehicle Technology and 
Information. As a consequence, this organization 
transformed from a relatively technically oriented 
expertise center to an information service provider for 
many governmental organizations, which in this specific 
case also involved the transfer of various tasks to this 
organization.  
Many discussions took place in the Project 
Organization, as a result of which the Project 
Organization’s composition changed repeatedly. At the 
same time, a new piece of legislation (WVW: 
Wegenverkeerswet, Act on Roads and Traffic) took place, 
which affected the functional requirements of the register.  
In reconstructing the decision-making process, it is 
striking that, as happened in the GBA case, three arenas 
could be discerned: one in which the system was designed, 
one in which data ownership issues were discussied, and a 
legal arena in which changes in legislation were prepared. 
These arenas did not exactly match with the (sub)project 
that had been identified on beforehand; moreover, issues 
concerning the system, data ownership and legal issues 
evolved at more than one moment in time and in various 
(sub)projects, and sometimes at specific moments in time, 
issues were more or less explicitly related to each other 
for example the data ownership issues and legal issues.   
Eventually, it has been decided to attribute data 
management issues related to general data (in terms of: 
procedures for gathering, registration, manipulation, 
dispersion of data) to the Center for Vehicle Technology 
and Information, issues related to specific data to various 
ministries, and to attribute system management 
responsibilities (system development, maintenance, 
educating personnel, et cetera) to the Center for Vehicle 
Technology and Information. In such a way, a division of 
tasks could be conceived that was technologically 
speaking, intrinsically complex, but more or less 
compatible with the (institutional) diversity of interests.  
5. Reflection and Lessons Learned 
In the cases of GBA and the NKR, we have seen that 
organizational-political and economic logic resulted in 
very sensitive decision-making processes regarding the 
development of interorganizational information systems. 
In both cases, a project management approach was chosen 
in order to minimize risks. Various subprojects were 
identified, and this contributed to the oversight of the 
whole project.  
It is striking that in both cases, discussions and struggle 
took place in arenas, that did not overlap with the 
subprojects that had been defined on beforehand. 
Moreover, arenas and (sub)projects were intertwined. In 
this respect, the emergence of arenas in which issues are 
discussed is not a feature of project management; these 
arenas were not identified on beforehand and the solutions 
to the complex problems were achieved by coupling 
issues from various arenas at strategic moments in time 
(e.g., the coupling of legal issues with issues regarding 
system and data management can be characterized as 
making use of windows of opportunity rather than of 
deliberate, prespecified choices). With respect to these 
characteristics, it can be concluded that project 
management techniques did not match the specific nature 
and dynamics of the interorganizational relationships as 
analyzed in section three.  
 
In the literature on complex decision making, there 
seems to be an increased appreciation for specific 
techniques that are expected to be able to better fit the 
dynamics and nature of networks and interorganizational 
relationships than project management techniques do, 
namely process management techniques [10]. 
Characteristics of project management techniques and 
process management techniques are contrasted in Table 1. 
Crucial to the distinction between project management 
techniques and process management techniques is that in 
project management techniques, by means of 
decomposition, risks of random events are minimized. By 
using process management, the fact is accepted that 
decision-making takes place in various arenas which are 
not defined on beforehand; the element of risk in terms of 
policy windows or windows of opportunities as perceived 
by the parties involved is a solution to problems rather 
than a phenomenon to be ignored. It is the explicit role of 
the process manager to have a sharp eye for policy 
windows as random events, as these events provide the 
opportunity to couple decision making in various arenas. 
In doing so, it is very likely that solutions can be reached 
that are impossible to accomplish using regular project 
management techniques.  
 
The development process of GBA and NKR is 
probably better understood from the point of view of 
process management than from the point of view of 
project management. Therefore, we claim that process 
management techniques provide a more fruitful alternative 
to project management techniques as the former seem to 
be more able to deal with the dynamics and nature of 
interorganizational relationships than the latter can.  
Therefore, the use of process management techniques 
in the development of interorganizational information 
systems (and: in the integration of back offices) provides a 
promising perspective on the problem of integrating the 
back-office of e-government initiatives. Central to the idea 
of process management of (interorganizational) ICT is 
that managing interorganizational ICT requires attention 
to processes of ‘consensus building’ and ‘cooperative 
behavior’ rather than that of a step-by-step development 
of an ICT architecture. As the process of ‘consensus 
building’ and ‘establishing cooperative behavior’ is very 
hard to achieve on beforehand, process management’s 
goal-seeking behavior (within general constraints) is more 
appealing than project management’s goal formalization.  
 Table 1: project- and process management characteristics 
(adapted from [10]) 
 Project 
Management 
Process 
Management 
Activities Unique Multiple  
Goal(s) Singular, under 
shared regime 
Various, under 
shared regime 
Orientation Short term  Long term 
Culture Heterogeneous  Heterogeneous, 
ambiguous and 
dynamic 
Organization Temporary 
project 
organization 
Interorganizational 
interactions to 
coordinate 
behavior 
Environment Uncertainty with 
respect to 
performance, 
costs, schedule 
Ambiguity with 
respect to 
performance, costs, 
schedule 
Conventions 
and 
procedures 
Affects existing 
conventions and 
procedures 
Seeks new 
conventions and 
procedures 
   
   
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have analyzed information exchanges 
that take place under the heading of (in this case, Dutch) 
e-government initiatives. These projects often involve 
many governmental organizations.  
By using a political economy point of view on 
exchanging information in networks of organizations, it is 
stated that information exchange is a very sensitive 
subject. This premise has been illustrated by presenting 
anecdotal evidence of the TransLease-, NHS- and CJS 
cases. The sensitivity can be explained by the fact that 
developing and implementing interorganizational 
information systems often implies standardization in some 
form and standardization may – in a very subtle way - 
amplify existing dependencies among organizations or 
mitigate incentives to perform well. Consequently, 
participants are less inclined to invest energy, effort and 
money in the development of the system and to enhance 
the information system with cost-saving or quality-
enhancing features. Eventually, such a diminishment of 
incentives results in less profitable, less functional and 
even less viable interorganizational information systems. 
In practice, even data wars have been observed that were 
associated with the specific nature and dynamics of 
interorganizational relations.  
 
In the observed GBA and NKR cases, consensus 
building and creating shared meaning, rather than top-
down ICT formalization and standardization, were 
important. Consensus building and creating shared 
meaning in the GBA and NKR cases took place in a 
process of coupling of issues in various arenas, which 
emerged throughout the process and were not identified 
on beforehand.  
 
It can be concluded that in complex interorganizational 
ICT initiatives, such as those in which achieving 
integration in back-office e-government initiatives is 
emphasized, project management approaches may be less 
fruitful than methods and strategies in which the emphasis 
is on goal-seeking, identifying win-win situations and 
coupling issues in various arenas (for example, a system 
design arena, a data ownership arena and a legislation 
arena). In the literature, process management approaches 
have been suggested that are better suited to deal with 
these issues than project management approaches can. 
Therefore, it is concluded that as e-government initiatives 
can be characterized as political economies, it is important 
to be able to build consensus and to couple issues between 
various arenas in e-government initiatives. Process 
management techniques provide interesting and fruitful 
strategies to deal with these challenges, and are therefore 
an attractive alternative to ‘traditional’ project 
management techniques in ensuring viable e-government 
initiatives.  
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